Dvaita rejects the mithyātva of the pot and affirms its objective reality. Advaita, however, does not call the pot mithyā in an illusory sense but regards its existence as non-independent — the pot has no reality apart from its constituents. In other words, Advaita denies that there can be a pot distinct from its material cause; its reality is conditional and borrowed from the underlying substratum (clay/Brahman).
Such a dependent existence itself also makes the 'effect' mithyā. In the rope-snake analogy, the snake imagined there has no 'isness' apart from the rope there. In other words the person in delusion should have said 'there is a rope', but due to some defects, he says 'there is a snake.' He is actually unknowingly transferring the rope's 'isness' to the snake.
Śaṅkara, commenting on Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6.2.3, emphasizes that all effects are nothing but their cause appearing under name and form.
“sadeva tu sarvam abhidhānam abhidhīyate ca yad anyabuddhyā, yathā rajjur eva sarpabuddhyā sarpa ity abhidhīyate, yathā vā piṇḍa-ghaṭādi mṛdo’nyabuddhyā piṇḍa-ghaṭādi-śabdenābhidhīyate loke.”
— “All this is really Existence alone, yet it is spoken of differently by a deluded cognition — just as the rope is called ‘snake’ or clay is called ‘lump’ or ‘pot’ by the ignorant.”
The effect (kārya), like the pot (ghaṭa), has no independent being apart from the cause. Śaṅkara says:
Thus, the pot’s being is borrowed from the clay (paratantra-sattā), not intrinsic.
The rajjū–sarpa example illustrates the mechanism of superimposition (adhyāsa). Śaṅkara explains:
“rajjur eva sarpabuddhyā sarpa ity abhidhīyate... mṛd-viveka-darśināṃ tu ghaṭādi-śabda-buddhi nivartate.”
“Just as the rope alone is perceived as ‘snake’ due to delusion, so the clay is called ‘lump’ or ‘pot’; when the discrimination of clay arises, the pot notion ceases.”
Here, the observer transfers the rope’s ‘is-ness’ to the snake, and analogously the clay’s sattā to the pot. This dependent existence is the essence of mithyātva.
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